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In human societies, cooperative behaviour in public goods interactions is usually en-
forced through institutions that impose sanctions on free-riders. Many experiments on
public goods games have shown that in the absence of such institutions, individuals are
often willing to punish defectors, even at a cost to themselves, effectively ’taking the law
into their own hands’1–11. Theoretical models conﬁrm that social norms prescribing the
punishment of deviant behaviour are stable: once established, they prevent invasion by
dissident minorities12–15. But how can such costly punishing behaviour gain a foothold
in the population? A surprisingly simple model shows that if individuals have the option
to stand aside and abstain from the public goods interaction, this paves the way for the
emergence and establishment of cooperative behaviour based on the punishment of defec-
tors. Thus the freedom to withdraw from the public enterprise leads to a self-enforcing
prosocial norm. Paradoxically, the option of individual autarky may be an important step
for the emergence of institutions punishing the non-cooperation of their members. Con-
versely, public goods interactions which are obligatory rather than voluntary are unlikely
to gain a foothold in the population.
An impressive body of evidence shows that many humans are willing to pay a personal
cost in order to punish wrong-doers1–10. In particular, punishment is a very effective mecha-
nism to ensure cooperation in public goods interactions. All human populations seem willing
to use costly punishment to varying degree, and their willingness to punish correlates with the
propensity for altruistic contributions11. This raises an evolutionary problem: in joint enter-
prises, free-riding individuals who do not contribute, but exploit the public goods, fare better
than those who pay the cost of contributing. If successful behaviour spreads, these defectors
will eventually take over, until there is nothing left to exploit. Punishment reduces the defector’s
payoff, and thus may solve the social dilemma. But since punishment is costly, it also reduces
the punishers’ payoff. This raises what has been called a ’second order social dilemma’. Costly
punishing is an altruistic act. Individuals who contribute, but do not punish, are better off than
the punishers. The frequency of punishers will dwindle and the defectors return.
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This second order defection can be punished in turn, and prevented to spread. Thus a free-
riding minority will be seriously harmed in the case of altruistic punishment (while it will
be pampered in the case of altruistic cooperation). Any social norm that includes the rule to
punish those who deviate is evolutionarily stable: once established, it cannot be displaced by
an invading minority of dissidents12. But how can such punishing behaviour gain a foothold in
the population? The trait has to be rare, initially, and thus will incur huge costs by ceaselessly
punishing. The emergence of altruistic punishing behaviour is acknowledged to be a major
puzzle in the evolution of cooperation. ”We seem to have replaced the problem of explaining
cooperation with that of explaining altruistic punishment”16.
We will show that the puzzle disappears if one assumes that individuals can voluntarily
decide whether to take part in the joint enterprise or not. If they do not participate, they can
obtain an autarkic payoff independent of the other players’ behaviour. Thus we consider four
strategies. The loners are those who do not participate in the public enterprise (they need not
be solitary individuals: they just abstain from the public goods game). Those who participate
include the defectors, who do not contribute but exploit the contributions of the others; the
cooperators, who contribute, but do not punish; and the punishers, who not only contribute
to the public good, but punish the defectors, and possibly also those who fail to punish the
defectors. In such a model, punishers will invade and take over. In the absence of the loner’s
option, however, they will often not be able to invade, and the population will be dominated
by defectors. This means that if participation in the joint enterprise is voluntary, cooperation-
enforcing behaviour emerges. If participation is obligatory (i.e. loners are excluded), then the
defectors will win.
This intriguing result was originally presented by Fowler17. But his argument was based on
a model with serious shortcomings, which does not justify the conclusions18. Here we propose
a model vindicating Fowler’s intuition. If individual autarky is an option, social norms enforc-
ing cooperation through punishment will emerge and come close to ﬁxation, whereas obligatory
participation in the public goods game leads to take-over by defectors. These theoretical ﬁnd-
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ings agree well with the results of recent experiments, and may offer a solution to one of the
most persistent problems in the evolution of cooperation.
We consider a well-mixed population of constant size M . From time to time, a random
sample of size N is selected and offered the option to participate in a public goods game.
Those who agree to do so can decide whether or not to contribute an investment of value c to
themselves. The individual contributions are added up and multiplied with a factor r > 1. The
resulting sum is then divided equally among all participants of the public goods game. After
this interaction, each contributor can impose a ﬁne β upon each defector, at a personal cost γ
for each ﬁne. Moreover, those who punish can also impose a ﬁne on those who contributed, but
failed to punish non-contributors. We shall assume for simplicity that for this second type of
punishment, ﬁnes and costs are reduced by a factor α, with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. By x we denote the
total number of cooperators (who contribute in the public goods game but do not punish), by y
that of defectors (who participate in the public goods game but do not contribute), by z that of
loners (unwilling to participate) and by w the number of punishers (who contribute, and punish
the defectors as well as the cooperators who did not punish the defectors in their group). Thus
M = x + y + z + w. We do not consider more complex strategies (basing their decision, for
instance, on the size and composition of the group, or on past experience).
Each loner receives a constant payoff σ. Among the random sample of size N , there will
be Nx cooperators, Ny defectors, Nz loners and Nw punishers. These are random variables dis-
tributed according to a multivariate distribution which describes sampling without replacement.
The group of those willing to participate in the public goods game has size S := Nx +Ny +Nw.
If S ≤ 1 then the public goods game does not take place. A player who volunteered for it
receives the loner’s payoff σ. If S > 1, each participant of the public goods game obtains an
income r(Nx +Nw)c/S. The payoff for the contributors (i.e. the cooperators and the punishers)
is reduced by c. The payoff for the defectors is reduced by βNw. The payoff for the cooperators
is reduced by αβNw, provided Ny > 0 (if there are no defectors in the group, non-punishing
behavior will go unnoticed). The payoff for punishers is reduced by γNy and, if Ny > 0, by
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αγNx.
This concludes the description of the strategic interaction18. We next specify how strategies
are transmitted within the population19. We deﬁne each players’ ﬁtness as 1−s+sP , the convex
combination of the ’baseline ﬁtness’, which is normalised to 1 for all players, and the payoff
P from the optional public goods game with punishment. The relative importance of each
component is determined by the selection strength s: small s means weak selection. We shall
assume that occasionally, a randomly chosen player can change strategy by adopting the strategy
of a player picked with a probability proportional to that player’s ﬁtness. This mimics a learning
process similar to the Moran process describing natural selection: more successful players are
copied more frequently. In addition, we shall assume that with a small probability µ, a player
can switch to another strategy irrespective of its payoff (this ”mutation term” corresponds to
blindly experimenting with anything different).
The analysis of the corresponding stochastic dynamics is greatly simpliﬁed in the limiting
case µ→ 0. The population consists almost always of one or two types at the most. This holds
because for µ = 0 the four monomorphic states are absorbing, and for very small µ the fate of a
mutant (i.e. its elimination or ﬁxation) is settled before the next mutant appears. The probabili-
ties ρij that a single i-player in a population of j-players reaches ﬁxation can be calculated for
i, j ∈ {x, y, z, w} (see online supporting material). This deﬁnes a transition matrix among the
four monomorphic states of the system, and hence a unique stationary distribution. For small
mutation rates µ, this distribution speciﬁes how likely the system is to be in the corresponding
pure state, or in its vicinity. Computer simulations show that the approximation also holds for
larger mutation rates (on the order of 1/M ).
The outcome is striking: in the limit of rare mutations, the system is most of the time in the
homogeneous state with punishers only, irrespective of the initial composition of the population.
For large populations (M = 1000 can be considered large for most of our prehistory) and small
mutation rates, the system spends more than 80 percent in or near the punisher state. This
prevalence diminishes only for very small selection strengths (Fig. 1).
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In the case of an obligatory public goods game, i.e. in the absence of the loner’s option, the
situation is very different: in the limit of rare mutations, the system spends most of the time in
or near the state with defectors only. For the same parameter values as before, the state is for
90 percent of the time dominated by defectors, and there is hardly any economic beneﬁt from
the public good (Fig. 2a). If all contributors punish (i.e. cooperators are excluded), the result
remains essentially the same: even if defectors prevail for obligatory public goods games, they
are eliminated if the public goods game is voluntary.
Volunteering in the absence of the punishment leads to a more cooperative outcome than for
the obligatory game but not to the ﬁxation of the cooperative state. The system exhibits a strong
tendency to cycle (from cooperators to defectors to loners and back to cooperators). Roughly
speaking, almost half of the time the state is dominated by loners. An outcome dominated
by cooperators is almost as likely, whereas domination by defectors is relatively rare. In the
limiting case of weak selection, the population even cooperates most of the time (Fig. 2b).
Whereas the limiting case of small mutation rates can be studied analytically (c.f. Figs.
1, 2, and the supplementary information), the case of substantial mutation rates can only be
handled by numerical simulations. Complementing interactive online tutorials are provided at
http://homepage.univie.ac.at/hannelore.brandt/publicgoods/ and the VirtualLabs at
http://www.univie.ac.at/virtuallabs. These show that the outcome is robust within a wide range
of parameter values. With cooperators, loners and defectors only, the latter do worst, whereas
the former two perform comparably well. With cooperators, punishers and defectors, but no
loners, punishers do not prevail, except for large mutation rates. In that case, the mutational
drift supplying defectors keeps the punishers active and prevents them from being undermined
by cooperators. If all four types are admitted, punishers prevail.
In an obligatory public goods game with cooperators and defectors only, the latter obviously
win. The loner’s option allows cooperators to persist (although they cannot dominate for a
substantial period). The reason is a simple rock-paper-scissors mechanism20–22. If there are
many defectors, loners will spread. When loners abound, many of the random samples will
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result in only small groups of players willing to participate. If the groups are sufﬁciently small,
the average payoff for cooperators will be larger than that for defectors, despite the fact that
within each group, the latter have a higher payoff than the former; it even pays for the individual
defector to switch to cooperation. Thus if the group is sufﬁciently small (S < r), there is no
social dilemma. This is a ﬂeeting state only: quickly, cooperators spread, group size increases
and the social dilemma returns. But the recurrent eclipse of the social dilemma allows punishers
eventually to step in and take over (see Fig. 3).
We have assumed in our model that a punisher faced with twice as many defectors metes
out twice as many ﬁnes. This assumption can be modiﬁed without affecting the conclusions. As
it stands, it makes the life of a rare punisher particularly difﬁcult. It is all the more remarkable
that punishers can invade nevertheless.
Whether cooperators who fail to punish are punished or not plays a surprisingly small role.
The parameter α has little inﬂuence on the numerical simulations, and does not show up in
the formulas (see supplementary information). The reason is that in the limiting case (µ very
small), the three types of punishers, cooperators and defectors rarely co-exist: hence punishers
cannot hold cooperators to account for not punishing defectors. In the case α = 0, the second
order social dilemma always holds: punishing is costly, and contributors failing to punish can
get away with it. Nevertheless, punishing behaviour can emerge and prevail, because the ﬁrst
order social dilemma occasionally breaks down. It is of interest in this context that experimental
evidence for the punishment of non-punishers (i.e. for non-vanishing α) seems to be lacking13.
For weak selection, an analytical condition for the dominance of punishers in the absence
of loners can be derived: 3(N − r) < N(N − 1)(β − γ) (see supplementary information).
This condition is satisﬁed in Fig. 2a and is reﬂected in the dominance of punishers for small
s. Moreover, if defectors are allowed to retaliate (in which case β is as large as γ) punishers
never dominate the population and loners are needed to establish cooperation. However, also
note that for strong selection it is clear that defectors always dominate because selection acts
against invasion attempts of cooperators as well as punishers (see Fig. 3 and supplementary
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information).
We could also assume that punishers penalise non-participants. The ﬁne could be δβ and
the cost to the punisher δγ, with 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Again, this has no great effect on the outcome. If
loners are frequent, many samples will contain no punisher. If punishers are frequent, defectors
are kept in check and non-participants do poorly, with or without being punished. The most
signiﬁcant difference seems to be that if punishers pay a heavy cost for penalising loners (high
δ and γ), then cooperators are needed to overcome the dominance of loners and catalyse the
take-over by punishers.
Differences between ﬁrst and second order social dilemma have been pointed out before in
a model14 based on a group selection scenario and exploiting the fact that when punishers are
common, individual level selection against them is weak and may be overcome by selection
among groups. Several other models conﬁrm that the punishment of defectors is stable, if it is
the prevalent norm. For example by assuming some degree of conformism in the population15:
individuals preferentially copy what is frequent. Similarly, cooperation can also be stabilised
through indirect reciprocity23, but in each of these cases, the emergence of the pro-social norm
remains unclear24,25.
Our model, in contrast, shows that even when initially rare, punishing behaviour can be
selectively advantageous, and is likely to become ﬁxed. We consider the most challenging sce-
nario, namely a single well-mixed population whose members imitate preferentially what fares
better, not what is more common. The effects of group selection and conformist transmission
will further the maintenance of this pro-social norm, once it is established.
The spread of initially rare punishers is also the outcome in Ref. 14. But that model, based
on an inﬁnitely large population, assumes that single cooperators can play the public goods
game, and obtain a payoff which is higher than that of loners (as high, in fact, as if the whole
population contributes to the public good). This neglects the fact that contributing to a public
goods game is a risky investment whose return depends on what other players are doing. By
contrast, our model leads, in the limiting case of an inﬁnitely large population, to a bistable
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outcome18. Depending on the initial condition, the state either ends up in a Nash equilibrium
consisting of cooperators and punishers only, or leads to endless oscillations of loners, defectors
and cooperators, without any punishers. Bistability also holds for the reputation-based model
26. Both approaches do not favour the spread of a minority of punishers. Their emergence is
boosted, in ﬁnite populations, by stochastic effects. Voluntary participation, by reducing group
size if defectors abound, promotes these stochastic effects.
Recent experiments show that if players can choose between joining a public goods game
either with or without punishment, they prefer the former27. The interpretation seems clear:
whoever freely accepts that defection is punished is unlikely to be a defector. It is thus less
risky to join such a group. Players voluntarily commit themselves to sanctioning rules. This
voluntary submission to a sanctioning regime is not always immediate, however: in the majority
of cases it requires a few preliminary rounds. Many players appear to have initial reservations
against a sanctioning regime and need a learning phase. In another series of experiments, it has
been shown that threatened punishment can decrease the level of cooperation in trust games28.
Moreover, players reduce their punishing behaviour if they have a less costly option (such as
excluding defectors from indirect reciprocity networks), but they do not give it up: rather, they
punish in a more focussed way29. Experimental evidence for altruistic punishment can also be
found in the ultimatum game (rejecting an unfair offer is costly to both players)2 and in indirect
reciprocity (by not helping defectors, players reduce their own chances of being helped)30.
Reports from present-day hunter-gatherer societies often stress their egalitarian and ’demo-
cratic’ features: individuals have a great deal of freedom31. This creates favourable conditions
for voluntary participation. Opting for the ’loner’ strategy does not mean living an eremit’s life;
it means not participating in a collective hunt, for instance, but collecting mushrooms instead.
On the other hand, ostracism was probably an early form of severe punishment. There seems to
be a smooth transition between choosing not to take part in a joint enterprise and being excluded
from it. Together, these two alternatives may explain the emergence of rule-enforcing institu-
tions promoting pro-social behaviour - following Hardins recipe for overcoming the tragedy of
9
the commons: mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon32. However, we must emphasise that
there are public good games where no one can stand aside: the preservation of our climate is
one example33. In such games, participation is obligatory – and defection widespread.
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Figure 1: Punishment and abstaining in public goods games in ﬁnite populations. In the limit
of rare mutations (µ → 0), the dynamics is restricted to transitions between the four homoge-
neous states with all cooperators (blue), defectors (red), loners (yellow) or punishers (green).
The two panels depict the probabilities of each state as a function of the selection strength
s for population sizes M = 100 (a) and M = 1000 (b). Simulation data for small muta-
tion rates conﬁrms the analytical results (colored dots). In contrast to the analysis, the ﬁt-
ness of individuals in the simulations is determined by a single random interaction rather than
the average. This is source of stochasticity and, together with the mutation rate, is responsi-
ble for the small differences between analytical results and the simulation data. Parameters:
N = 5, r = 3, σ = 1, γ = 1, β = 2, α = 0.1, smax = 0.151; Simulations: a mutation rate µ = 10
−4,






















































Figure 2: Punishment in obligatory public goods games (a) and voluntary participation in public
goods games without punishment (b). In the limit of rare mutations, the dynamics reduces to
transitions between homogeneous states with all cooperators (blue), defectors (red), punishers
(green) or loners (yellow). The probabilities for each state are shown as a function of the
selection strength s. In the limit of neutral evolution (s = 0) the strategic differences disappear
and all three respective states become equally likely. In a the system is usually found in a state
with all defectors, except for weak selection where punishers manage to get the upper hand.
In contrast, in b, the system spends signiﬁcantly more time in the cooperator or loner states
than in the defector state. Parameters: N = 5, r = 3, σ = 1, γ = 1, β = 2, α = 0.1,M = 100; a
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Figure 3: Schematic dynamics for a obligatory public goods games with punishment, b volun-
tary public goods games, and c the combined effects of volunteering and punishment in ﬁnite
populations. In the limit of rare mutations, the dynamics is reduced to transition probabilities
between the homogeneous states with all cooperators (C), defectors (D), loners (L) or punish-
ers (P). The three panels depict all transition probabilities > 0.01% together with the relative
time τ spent in each state for maximal selection strength. a In the absence of loners, defectors
dominate despite punishment. The cooperator and punisher state are connected by a neutral
edge with a transition probability of 1/M in either direction (dashed line). The defector state is
essentially stable with transition probabilities to the cooperators state of < 10−4 and still many
orders of magnitude smaller to reach the punisher state. b In voluntary public goods games
the transition probabilities illustrate the cyclic dominance of the three strategies and illustrate
that the system spends little time in the defector state because of the large transition proba-
bility D → L. c Combining the two mechanisms illustrates the pivotal role of loners where the
system can embark on another cooperator-defector-loner cycle or switch to the punisher state.
Parameters: N = 5, r = 3, σ = 1, γ = 1, β = 2,M = 100, s = 0.151.
15
